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Abstract:  
We analyze the impact of globalization on individual gains from trade in a general 
equilibrium model of monopolistic competition featuring product diversity, pro-
competitive effects and income heterogeneity between and within countries. We show 
that, although trade reduces markups in both countries, its impact on variety depends on 
their relative position in the world income distribution: product diversity in the lower 
income country always expands, while that in the higher income country may shrink. 
When the latter occurs, the richer consumers in the higher income country may lose 
from trade because the relative importance of variety versus quantity increases with 
income. Using data on GDP per capita and population, as well as on the U.S. income 
distribution, we illustrate our theoretical results in two different contexts: the hypothetical 
bilateral trade liberalization between the U.S. and 188 countries; and the historical 
sequence of U.S. free trade agreements since 1985. 
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1 Introduction
The questions of whether there are gains from trade and how these gains are distributed are two of
the oldest, and most fundamental ones, in international economics. As is well known, trade alters
the distribution of income across some broad `classes' such as workers and the owners of capital
(Jones, 1965). Trade also adversely aects the owners of resources that are specic to import-
competing sectors (Jones, 1971). While it is, therefore, possible that trade hurts particular groups,
the fundamental insight advocated by economists is that, under the assumption of perfect markets,
the nation as a whole unambiguously gains. Such gains from trade at the aggregate level have also
been largely conrmed under imperfect competition where product diversity and scale economies
matter (Helpman and Krugman, 1985, Ch.9).1
Do these aggregate gains from trade, which theoretically make possible a Pareto-improving re-
distribution, constitute a relevant welfare criterion for globalization? The answer is likely to be
negative. Globalization, as Stiglitz (2006, p.63) puts it, \only promises that the country as a whole
will benet. Theory predicts that there will be losers. In principle, the winners could compensate the
losers; in practice, this almost never happens." Given that compensation mechanisms are unlikely
to operate, gains from trade should be assessed at the individual level. The relevant criterion is
then whether aggregating individual preferences for trade, not aggregating individual gains, leads to
globalization. The answer clearly depends on the fraction of agents who gain from trade, irrespective
of the magnitude of aggregate gains.
We explore the impact of globalization on individual gains from trade through variety and price
changes in a general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition. There are two crucial ingredi-
ents. First, workers are heterogeneous in terms of labor eciency and, therefore, in terms of income,
both between and within countries. Second, unlike in the constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
case, the relative importance of variety versus quantity changes with income. For these ingredients
to be jointly eective, we extend the variable elasticity of substitution (VES) model featuring income
eects by Behrens and Murata (2007) to allow for income heterogeneity. Within such a framework,
1Helpman and Krugman (1985) derive the general result that there are gains from trade: (i) when free trade income
and prices enable the economy to purchase autarky aggregate consumption quantities; and (ii) when switching from
autarky to free trade expands product diversity in consumption.
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individual gains from trade can be decomposed into those due to product diversity and those due to
pro-competitive eects.2
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, in the presence of income heterogeneity
between countries, the impact of trade on variety depends on their relative position in the world
income distribution. In the lower income country, product diversity in consumption always expands,
whereas it may shrink in the higher income country. Second, trade always reduces markups in both
countries. Consequently, all individuals in the lower income country gain from trade because of lower
markups and greater product diversity in consumption. Turning to the higher income country, two
cases may arise. First, when its trading partner has suciently similar average income, the range of
varieties expands and markups fall, thus beneting all consumers. Second, when its trading partner
has suciently lower average income, the range of varieties shrinks, while markups fall. In the latter
case, whether individuals in the higher income country gain or not depends on their position in the
domestic income distribution.
We show that it is the richer consumers in the higher income country who may lose from trade
because in our VES framework the relative importance of variety versus quantity increases with
income. The intuition is that the richer consumers benet only little from increased quantity due
to lower price-wage ratios, whereas reduced product diversity hurts them. On the contrary, lower
income consumers care less about variety but more about quantity, and they gain from trade even
when facing less product diversity because the lower price-wage ratios allow them to consume more
of each variety. Our result thus suggests that measured income inequality under a trade regime may
overstate `real' inequality, as the former neglects the dierent trade-os between variety and quantity
faced by high and low income consumers.3
We illustrate how many individuals in the higher income country lose from trade in two dierent
contexts: the hypothetical bilateral trade liberalization between the U.S. and 188 countries; and
2To focus entirely on these two aspects, we abstract from comparative advantage and factor proportions by consid-
ering a setting with a single production factor. Our analysis is complementary to that of Mayer (1984) who investigates
individual welfare in a Heckscher-Ohlin framework by abstracting from product diversity and pro-competitive eects.
3This is reminiscent of Broda and Romalis (2009), who show that much of the rise in measured U.S. income inequal-
ity is oset by a relative decline in the prices of low quality products that low income consumers buy. Interestingly,
they also show that both rich and poor households have reduced the number of varieties they consume.
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the historical sequence of U.S. free trade agreements (FTAs) since 1985. Using data on GDP per
capita and population, as well as on the U.S. income distribution, we show that U.S. intra-industry
trade with countries of similar GDP per capita makes all agents in both countries better o, whereas
U.S. intra-industry trade with countries having lower GDP per capita may adversely aect up to
10% of the U.S. population.4 We further decompose the welfare changes at the individual level into
those due to product diversity and those due to pro-competitive eects. In the case of Canada-U.S.
trade, for example, increased product diversity contributes 24% to the welfare change at the median
income level, whereas the remaining 76% arises from increased consumption due to lower markups.
The corresponding gures at the top 5% of the income distribution are 63% for product diversity and
37% for pro-competitive eects. We nally show that the welfare changes in the historical sequence
of U.S. FTAs need not be monotone, and that it is the lower income consumers who eventually
gain more from these trade liberalizations. Interestingly, our analysis further suggests that the U.S.
FTA with Canada (a country of similar income) in 1988 benets mostly the richer consumers in the
U.S. via greater product diversity, whereas the entry of Mexico (a country of lower income) in 1994
benets mostly the lower income consumers in the U.S. via lower markups.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. We
present the model in Section 3 and derive analytical results in Section 4. Section 5 provides some
numerical illustrations, and Section 6 discusses the robustness of our results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related literature
Recent empirical research in international trade has substantiated the importance of product diver-
sity and pro-competitive eects. Broda and Weinstein (2006) document that the number of U.S.
import varieties rose by 212% between 1972 and 2001, which maps into U.S. welfare gains of about
2:6%. However, since they ignore the reduction of domestic varieties due to trade, their analysis
provides only a partial view on the welfare impacts of trade. A more recent study by Feenstra and
4As examples of countries with high intra-industry trade and lower GDP per capita we may think of relatively
new OECD countries like Hungary, Mexico, Poland, and Slovak Republic. Indeed, recently the OECD (2002, p.161)
classied these countries as having \high and increasing intra-industry trade". This suggests that countries with high
intra-industry trade are becoming more dissimilar in terms of GDP per capita.
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Weinstein (2010) points out that the CES specication in Broda and Weinstein (2006) abstracts
from endogenous markups and thus may overstate gains from import varieties. Indeed, Feenstra and
Weinstein (2010) compare their estimated gains from trade in a VES model based on Feenstra (2003),
with those in Broda and Weinstein (2006). Interestingly, although the overall gains are roughly the
same in the two specications, the underlying mechanism is quite dierent: the CES model ascribes
all gains to new import varieties, whereas in their VES model increased product diversity explains
two-thirds of the overall gains with the remaining one-third being driven by pro-competitive eects.
Badinger (2007) also nds solid evidence that the Single Market Programme of the EU has reduced
markups by 26% in aggregate manufacturing of 10 member states.5
Despite such empirical evidence, the relative importance of product diversity and pro-competitive
eects has not been explored at the individual level until now. For example, Feenstra and Weinstein
(2010) work with a representative agent model, which excludes the possibility that their relative
importance varies across agents with dierent incomes. Mayer (1984) analyzes how the dierence
in capital endowments across individuals maps into individual preferences for trade openness via
changes in factor prices as implied by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. This prediction, derived
under perfect competition, has been recently examined and conrmed by using individual survey
data (e.g., Balistreri, 1997; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Mayda and Rodrik, 2005). However, this
strand of literature abstracts from product diversity and pro-competitive eects.
On the contrary, the monopolistic competition literature focuses either or both on product di-
versity and pro-competitive eects, but usually does not take into account income heterogeneity
(Krugman 1979, 1980). One notable exception is Krugman (1981) who considers a two-factor two-
sector monopolistic competition model without intersectoral factor mobility. Since countries dier in
relative factor endowments, not only product diversity but also factor prices determine whether each
factor gains or not. However, there is no income heterogeneity within each factor. Another notable
exception is Helpman et al. (2010). Their model allows to analyze the impact of trade on individual
welfare since heterogeneous workers are matched with heterogeneous rms. Yet, pro-competitive
eects do not arise in Krugman (1981) and Helpman et al. (2010) due to the CES specication.
5See also Levinsohn (1993), Harrison (1994) and Tybout (2003) for earlier empirical evidence on pro-competitive
eects of international trade.
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In our model, when income heterogeneity and variable demand elasticity are jointly taken into
account, trade may reduce product diversity in consumption. This can arise even when the number
of import varieties increases, because there is a reduction in domestic varieties. Such a variety loss
has important welfare implications across consumers with dierent income levels. Saint-Paul (2006)
also uses a VES model to analyze the impact of globalization on wages when the total mass of rms
is exogenous and when there is no income heterogeneity within each country. Since our model allows
for free entry and exit and income heterogeneity both between and within countries, we can analyze
more precisely how the relative importance of variety and quantity aects individual welfare.
Furthermore, Flam and Helpman (1987) and Stokey (1991) consider the relative importance
of quality and quantity. Although this literature on vertical product dierentiation essentially deals
with the patterns of consumption and specialization, we investigate the impact of trade on individual
welfare in the presence of income heterogeneity between and within countries.6 Our paper is thus
more related to a recent paper by Fajgelbaum et al. (2011), who show that trade liberalization
benets the poorer households in wealthy countries, and that the richer households in countries that
experience a fall in the eective number of high-quality varieties may lose. However, the underlying
mechanisms are very dierent. In their discrete choice model, each individual consumes a single
variety and the marginal value of quality is higher for the richer households, whereas in our paper
individuals, who dier in the relative importance of variety and quantity, consume a set of varieties.
Last, our model is related to Fieler (2011), who focuses on trade ows under non-homothetic
preferences and income heterogeneity between countries. Although she checks the robustness of her
results by allowing for income heterogeneity within each country, she does not address how gains
are distributed within each country. Furthermore, the mass of varieties in each sector is xed in her
model, so that there are, by assumption, neither variety gains nor losses.
6Unlike Flam and Helpman (1987) and Stokey (1991), Matsuyama (2000) emphasizes demand complementarities
under perfect competition, whereas we focus on varieties and markups under monopolistic competition.
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3 Model
Consider a world with two countries, labeled r = H;F .7 Variables associated with each country will
be subscripted accordingly. Each country is endowed with a mass Lr of population. Let L  LH+LF
denote the world population, and let   LH=L stand for the population share of country H. We
assume that labor is the only factor of production and that it is internationally immobile. The labor
eciency may dier both between and within countries. We denote by Gr the cumulative distribution
function and by gr the density function of labor eciency in country r. Both are assumed to be
continuously dierentiable with support [0;1) unless otherwise specied. An individual with labor
eciency hr supplies inelastically that many units of labor. The aggregate labor supply in country
r is then given by Lrhr, where hr 
R
hrdGr(hr) is the average labor eciency.
3.1 Preferences
We start with a single monopolistically competitive industry producing a continuum of varieties
of a horizontally dierentiated consumption good. We extend the model to multiple industries in
Section 6.2. Let 
r denote the set of varieties produced in country r, with measure nr. Hence,
N  nr + ns stands for the endogenously determined mass of varieties in the global economy.
Following Behrens and Murata (2007), we assume that preferences are additively separable over
varieties and that the subutility functions are of the `constant absolute risk aversion' (CARA) type:
max Ur 
Z

r

1  e qrr(i) di+ Z

s

1  e qsr(j) dj
s:t:
Z

r
pr(i)qrr(i)di+
Z

s
ps(j)qsr(j)dj = Er(hr);
where pr(i) and ps(j) stand for the prices of varieties i and j produced in countries r and s;
8
qrr(i) and qsr(j) stand for the consumption of domestic and foreign varieties in country r; Er(hr)
stands for expenditure; and  > 0 is a parameter. An individual with labor eciency hr spends
7To reduce the notational burden, we present a two-country version of the model. We extend it to a multi-country
setting in Section 5.2 when quantifying the impacts of multilateral trade on the U.S. population.
8We assume that there are no impediments to trade and that product markets are integrated, i.e., rms cannot
price discriminate across markets. This explains why there is only a single subscript for prices.
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Er(hr)  wrhr + =L, where wr stands for the wage rate in country r and =L stands for the
identical claim to aggregate prots across individuals.9
As shown in Appendix A, the demand functions in country r at an interior solution are given by:
qrr(i; hr) =
Er(hr)
P
  1
P
Z

r
ln

pr(i)
pr(j)

pr(j)dj +
Z

s
ln

pr(i)
ps(j)

ps(j)dj

; (1)
qsr(j; hr) =
Er(hr)
P
  1
P
Z

r
ln

ps(j)
pr(i)

pr(i)di +
Z

s
ln

ps(j)
ps(i)

ps(i)di

; (2)
where P  R

r
pr(k)dk+
R

s
ps(k)dk. Because marginal utility at zero consumption is nite, demands
need not be strictly positive in equilibrium. This property allows us to avoid that the welfare gains
from the introduction of new varieties are implausibly large (Feenstra and Weinstein, 2010). In
Section 4.5, we derive a sucient condition for the price equilibrium to be symmetric, which then
makes sure that (1) and (2) hold since the solution will be interior.
Finally, because of the continuum assumption, changes in an individual price have no impact on
the price aggregates, so that the own-price derivatives are as follows:
@qrr(i; hr)
@pr(i)
=   1
pr(i)
and
@qsr(j; hr)
@ps(j)
=   1
ps(j)
; (3)
which yields the variable demand elasticities:
  pr(i)
qrr(i; hr)
@qrr(i; hr)
@pr(i)
=
1
qrr(i; hr)
and   ps(j)
qsr(j; hr)
@qsr(j; hr)
@ps(j)
=
1
qsr(j; hr)
:
3.2 Technology
All rms have access to the same increasing returns to scale technology. To produce Q(i) units
of any variety requires cQ(i) + f units of labor, where c and f denote the marginal and the xed
labor requirements, respectively. We assume that rms can costlessly dierentiate their products
and that there are no scope economies. Thus, there is a one-to-one correspondence between rms
and varieties, so that the mass of varieties N also stands for the mass of rms operating in the global
economy. There is free entry and exit in each country, which implies that nr and ns are endogenously
9Since our focus is not on the sources of income heterogeneity, we assume that it is solely driven by the dierence
in labor eciency, not by the dierence in prot claims. The assumption of equal prot claims entails no loss of
generality as each rm is negligible and earns zero prot under free entry and exit.
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determined by the zero prot conditions. The prot of rm i in country r is given by:
r(i) = [pr(i)  cwr]Qr(i)  fwr; (4)
where Qr(i)  Lr
R
qrr(i; hr)dGr(hr) + Ls
R
qrs(i; hs)dGs(hs) stands for its output.
3.3 Equilibrium
Each rm in country r maximizes its prot (4) with respect to pr(i), given the rm distribution
(nH ; nF ) and factor prices (wH ; wF ). Rearranging terms, the rst-order conditions are expressed as:
@r(i)
@pr(i)
= Qr(i)  L [pr(i)  cwr]
pr(i)
= 0: (5)
A price equilibrium is a price distribution satisfying condition (5) for all rms in countries H and F .
An equilibrium is a price equilibrium and couples (nH ; nF ) and (wH ; wF ) of a rm distribution and
factor prices such that national factor markets clear, trade is balanced, and rms earn zero prots.
Formally, an equilibrium is a solution to the following three conditions:Z

H

cQH(i) + f

di = LH
Z
hHdGH(hH); (6)Z

F

cQF (j) + f

dj = LF
Z
hFdGF (hF ); (7)
LH
Z Z

F
pF (j)qFH(j; hH)djdGH(hH) = LF
Z Z

H
pH(i)qHF (i; hF )didGF (hF ); (8)
where all quantities are evaluated at a price equilibrium. One may choose either wH or wF as the
numeraire. However, we need not do so since the model is fully determined in real terms. Finally,
rms earn zero prots when conditions (6){(8) hold, so that the expenditure of an individual with
labor eciency hr is solely given by wage income: Er(hr) = wrhr.
4 Theoretical results
4.1 Free trade
Two questions arise in our model with income heterogeneity and nite marginal utility at zero
consumption: (i) under which conditions is the price equilibrium symmetric; and (ii) under which
9
conditions are product and factor prices equalized under free trade? Note that the answers to these
questions are not trivial. Indeed, some rms may nd it protable to deviate from symmetric pricing
by charging higher prices to higher income consumers while excluding lower income consumers.
Furthermore, rms sell dierentiated varieties, so that product price equalization (PPE) and factor
price equalization (FPE) need not hold under free trade, even if many studies assume, rather than
prove, that this is the case. In what follows, we rst show that free trade leads to both PPE and
FPE provided that each individual consumes all varieties. We formally derive a sucient condition
for this to hold in Section 4.5.
Proposition 1 Assume that each individual consumes all varieties. Then, free trade leads to product
and factor price equalization. Furthermore, the product price is uniquely given by
p = cw +
E
N
where E  
Z
EH(hH)dGH(hH) + (1  )
Z
EF (hF )dGF (hF ): (9)
Proof. See Appendix B.
Two comments are in order. First, as can be seen from (9), there are pro-competitive eects,
i.e., the prot-maximizing price is decreasing in the mass of competing rms. Second, markups are
increasing in the average expenditure E.10 Since FPE implies that E = wh, where h  hH+(1 )hF
denotes the world average labor eciency, the product price can be rewritten as
p =

1 +
h
cN

cw: (10)
The intuition for why markups increase with the average expenditure E is as follows. The elasticity
of aggregate demand, given by  (pr(i)=Qr(i))(@Qr(i)=@pr(i)) = [Qr(i)=(Lr + Ls)] 1, depends on
the average demand. As the latter increases with E, rms that face higher average expenditure will,
ceteris paribus, charge higher markups due to the less elastic aggregate demand that they face.
Since all rms charge the same price (10) and sell the same quantity Q = w(LHhH+LFhF )=(Np),
labor market clearing implies that nH=nF = (LHhH)=(LFhF ), which yields
nr =
Lrhr
f

1  cw
p

: (11)
10Using `0/1 preferences', Foellmi et al. (2008) obtain a similar product price when labor eciency diers between
countries but population sizes are the same. Our product price, however, depends both on income heterogeneity and
on population shares. By contrast, the product price in Foellmi et al. (2008) includes trade costs. See Behrens et
al. (2009) for how trade costs aect the product price in the CARA model with heterogeneous rms.
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Inserting (10) into (11), and doing the same with the analogous expressions for s 6= r, yields two
equations with two unknowns nH and nF . Solving for the equilibrium masses of rms, we obtain
nH = hHD(L) and nF = (1  )hFD(L), where D(L)  [
p
4cfL+ (f)2   f ]=(2cf) > 0.11 The
equilibrium mass of rms in the global economy is then given by
N  nH + nF = hD(L); (12)
which is increasing in h for any given value of Lh. In words, a higher average labor eciency maps
into greater product diversity for any given aggregate labor supply. The intuition is that, unlike an
increase in L, an increase in h makes demands less elastic as consumers are richer and thus less price
sensitive. This raises markups by (10), thus leading to additional entry and the production of more
varieties, as compared with the case of an increase in population.12
4.2 Autarky
We now consider the autarky case to analyze the impact of trade on varieties and markups. Assume
that country r is in autarky (formally, 
s = ; and Ls = 0). Since the price equilibrium is symmetric
as shown in Proposition 1, we again suppress the variety index i. Inserting (1) into (5), and letting
qrs = 0, the unique price equilibrium is given by:
par =

1 +
hr
cnar

cwar ; (13)
where an a-superscript denotes autarky values. Note that (13) is a special case of (10).
The price equilibrium (13) implies that all rms sell the same quantity Qar = w
a
rLrhr=(n
a
rp
a
r),
which, when inserted into the labor market clearing condition (6), implies:
nar =
Lrhr
f

1  cw
a
r
par

: (14)
Expressions (13) and (14) allow us to solve for the equilibrium mass of rms as follows:
nar = hrD(Lr): (15)
11The other root is negative and must, therefore, be ruled out.
12As is well known, under non-homothetic preferences, population and labor eciency (per capita income) play
dierent roles in key variables such as the income elasticity of demand and the mass of varieties produced and
consumed (e.g., Murata, 2009). See Hepenstrick (2010), Fieler (2011), and Simonovska (2011) for recent applications
of non-homothetic preferences to international trade.
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Again, nar is increasing in hr for any given value of Lrhr. Thus, in autarky, a higher average labor
eciency maps into greater product diversity for any given aggregate labor supply.
4.3 The impact of trade on varieties and markups
Without loss of generality, we assume that the average labor eciency in country H is higher than or
equal to that in country F , i.e., hH  hF . Comparing expressions (11) and (14), we see that nr < nar
if and only if the free trade price-wage ratio is smaller than the autarky price-wage ratio. We show
that this is always the case, as in Krugman (1979) and Feenstra (2004). Interestingly, however, unlike
in the existing literature without income heterogeneity, we further show that product diversity in
consumption need not expand for both countries when switching from autarky to trade. The following
proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 2 Assume that the average labor eciency in country H is greater than or equal to
that in country F , i.e., hH  hF . When compared with autarky, we show that under free trade: (i)
the mass of varieties consumed in country H decreases if and only if
hD(L) < hHD(LH); (16)
whereas that in country F always increases; (ii) the mass of varieties produced in each country
decreases; and (iii) the price-wage ratio falls in each country.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Two comments are in order. First, Proposition 2 illustrates domestic exit of rms due to the
pro-competitive eects of international trade. As seen from the equilibrium price-wage ratios
par
war
= c+

D(Lr)
and
p
w
= c+

D(L)
; (17)
the equilibrium markups in both countries decrease under free trade, thus driving some rms out
of each national market. Labor market clearing then implies that rm-level and total production
expands, as labor is reallocated from the xed requirements of closing rms to the marginal require-
ments of surviving rms. Contrary to the growing literature on rm heterogeneity in international
12
trade, which relies on the CES specication (e.g., Melitz, 2003), our model captures the `old idea'
that trade reduces markups and triggers exit of rms even without rm heterogeneity.13
Second, and more importantly, Proposition 2 shows that the increase in import varieties may be
dominated by the reduction in domestic varieties, and that whenever there is a variety loss, it occurs
in the higher income country. The intuition underlying the variety loss can be explained in terms of
the aggregate labor supply and the price-cost margin as follows. Using N = nH + nF and (11), as
well as (14), the condition for the variety loss, N < naH , can be rewritten as:
LHhH + LFhF
f

1  cw
p

<
LHhH
f

1  cw
a
H
paH

, (LHhH + LFhF )D(L)
L
< (LHhH)
D(LH)
LH
:
This inequality highlights two channels through which trade integration aects the mass of varieties
consumed in country H. First, note that D(L)=L < D(LH)=LH . Trade integration thus reduces the
price-cost margin, thereby reducing the mass of domestic varieties. Other things equal, this reduces
the mass of varieties consumed. Second, LHhH + LFhF > LHhH . Thus, trade allows individuals
in country H to consume import varieties produced in country F , which eectively increases the
aggregate labor supply and tends to compensate the reduction of domestic varieties. Note that,
given LH and hH (and thus holding the right-hand side constant), the smaller the population LF
and/or the labor eciency hF of the trading partner, the more likely the condition is to be satised.
In such a case, the loss of domestic varieties due to the lower price-cost margin will not be oset by
the increase in import varieties produced by foreign labor. Hence, consumption diversity in country
H decreases when trading with a suciently inecient and/or small partner.14
13One notable exception is Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) who recently proposed a model that explains trade-induced
exit by combining pro-competitive eects and rm heterogeneity in a monopolistic competition framework. However,
due to their quasi-linear specication, there is no point in introducing income heterogeneity in their model as higher
income consumers would spend their additional income only on the numeraire good. Note also that in our model free
trade markups depend on the global market size Lr + Ls, whereas markups in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) depend
on the local market size Lr, even in the open economy case.
14Variable elasticity and income heterogeneity between countries, as well as income eects, are crucial for our results.
Baldwin and Forslid (2010) and Arkolakis et al. (2008) obtain a similar variety loss in CES models with homogeneous
consumers. Yet, as we show in Section 4.4, the welfare implications are quite dierent. In our VES model, welfare
decreases for a subset of consumers because the relative importance of variety versus quantity changes with income.
By contrast, they show that welfare rises even when there is a variety loss.
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4.4 Individual gains from trade
We analyze individual gains from trade by decomposing welfare changes into those due to product
diversity and those due to pro-competitive eects. Since the price equilibrium is symmetric under
both autarky and free trade, the utility dierence between free trade and autarky for an individual
with labor eciency hr in country r = H;F is given by
Ur(hr)  Ur(hr)  Uar (hr) = N

1  e whrNp

  nar

1  e 
warhr
narp
a
r

:
Adding and subtracting nare
 whr=(narp), we obtain the following decomposition:
Ur(hr)  N

1  e whrNp

  nar

1  e whrnarp

| {z }
Product diversity
+nar

e
 w
a
rhr
narp
a
r   e whrnarp

| {z }
Pro-competitive eects
; (18)
which isolates the two channels, namely product diversity and pro-competitive eects, through which
gains from trade materialize. The former captures welfare changes through product diversity given
the wage-price ratio under free trade w=p, whereas the latter captures welfare changes through the
wage-price ratio given product diversity under autarky nar .
Using the results of Proposition 2 and the welfare decomposition (18), we rst consider the
benchmark case in which the two countries have the same average labor eciency. Noting that
expression (16) never holds when hH = hF , we can show the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Assume that the two countries have the same average labor eciency, i.e., hH =
hF = h. Then, free trade raises welfare through greater product diversity in consumption and through
lower price-wage ratios for all individuals in both countries.
Proof. See Appendix D.
By contrast, when hH > hF , the mass of varieties consumed in country H may decrease, as seen
from Proposition 2. In that case, the rst term in (18) is no longer positive. When this occurs, there
may be losses from trade in the higher income country despite a fall in the price-wage ratios. We now
analyze who in the higher income country may lose from trade. Noting that the relative importance
of variety and quantity changes with income in (18), we can prove the following proposition.
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Proposition 4 Assume that country H has a higher average labor eciency than country F , i.e.,
hH > h > hF . Then, when (16) holds, there exists a unique threshold h
loss
H in country H such that
UH(hH) T 0 for hH S hlossH . Otherwise, free trade raises the welfare of all consumers in country H.
In country F, free trade always raises the welfare of all consumers.
Proof. See Appendix E.
Proposition 4 shows that it is the richer consumers in the higher income country who may lose
from trade, because the relative importance of variety versus quantity increases with income. The
intuition is that since utility is bounded for each variety in our framework, the richer consumers
benet only little from increased quantity due to a fall in the price-wage ratios, whereas decreased
product diversity hurts them. In contrast, lower income consumers care less about variety but
more about quantity, and they gain from trade even when facing less product diversity because the
lower price-wage ratios allow them to consume more of each variety. The losses from trade due to
income heterogeneity are reminiscent of those in Epifani and Gancia (2011), who show that markup
heterogeneity across sectors causes welfare losses under restricted entry despite the decline in the
average markup. Yet, welfare always increases when entry is free in their framework. In our model,
losses from trade may exist even when entry is unrestricted, but only for a subset of consumers.
4.5 Existence of the symmetric equilibrium with a variety loss
So far, we have assumed that each individual consumes all varieties. However, in the presence
of income heterogeneity and nite marginal utility at zero consumption, some rms may nd it
protable to deviate from the symmetric price by charging higher prices to higher income consumers
while excluding lower income consumers. We now derive a sucient condition under which rms
have no such incentive to unilaterally deviate from the symmetric price.
Assume that a deviating rm in country r charges the price ep, whereas all the other rms charge
the price p given by (9). Since the deviating rm is negligible to the market, wages are unaected and
remain equalized between countries under free trade. The labor eciencies of the marginal consumers
hlr(ep) and hls(ep), who are indierent between consuming and not consuming the variety produced by
the deviating rm, must satisfy qrr(ep; hlr(ep)) = qrs(ep; hls(ep)) = 0. Noting that hlr(ep) = hls(ep)  eh, we
can prove the following proposition.
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Proposition 5 A sucient condition for (9) to be a price equilibrium is given by
h

heh  eh+ h1 + cD(L)

1  e  +cD(L)
eh
h

; 8eh > 0; (19)
where
h

heh  
R1eh hH dGH(hH) + (1  ) R1eh hF dGF (hF )

R1eh dGH(hH) + (1  ) R1eh dGF (hF )
is the average labor eciency of those who exceed the threshold eh.
Proof. See Appendix F.
Some comments are in order. First, when the rm charges the same price p as all the other rms
(ep = p), the inequality in (19) is satised since eh = 0 and h
heh = h. Second, if the rm deviates
and charges higher prices (ep > p), then eh > 0 and thus h
heh on the left-hand side of (19) increases.
At the same time, the right-hand side increases, too. Intuitively, the sucient condition (19) for the
symmetric price equilibrium states that the average income of those who consume the variety should
not rise too fast. If it is satised, the unique prot-maximizing price is given by (9), and thus PPE
and FPE hold.15 Should it not be satised, the rm may nd it protable to deviate by excluding
lower income consumers and charging higher markups to richer consumers. Last, note that it is never
protable to deviate from the symmetric price by charging lower prices (ep < p) as such a deviation
does not aect the mass of consumers with positive demand.
Finally, one may ask whether there exists a set of parameter values satisfying both the condition
for the variety loss (16) and the sucient condition (19). It should be clear from (19) that this
question is hard to answer for arbitrary distributions GH and GF . We hence focus on two special
cases, point-mass distributions and exponential distributions, to derive sets of parameter values for
which conditions (16) and (19) jointly hold.16
15FPE is compatible with income heterogeneity between and within countries because of the dierence in labor
eciency. This paper focuses on the case in which FPE holds since our aim is to analyze the impact of trade on
individual welfare in the presence of income heterogeneity, with less emphasis on the sources of this heterogeneity.
16We will show that even when using non-parametric income distributions, the condition for the variety loss (16)
and the sucient condition (19) jointly hold in many cases.
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Proposition 6 Assume that hr = hr for all hr in each country. Then, the condition for the variety
loss (16) and the sucient condition (19) jointly hold when
	()  (1  )D(L)
D(L)  D(L) <
hH
hF
 2  
1    ():
Proof. See Appendix G.
The condition for the variety loss can be rewritten as 	() < hH=hF , whereas the sucient
condition implies hH=hF  (). There are four possible cases, depending on whether or not (16)
and (19) are satised. Case (I) in Figure 1 shows that when hH=hF is suciently small, no rm
wants to deviate, and hence, PPE and FPE hold. Furthermore, product diversity expands in both
countries under free trade irrespective of the value of . More interestingly, in case (II), there exists
couples (; hH=hF ) such that no rm wants to deviate, and hence, PPE and FPE hold; whereas
product diversity in consumption shrinks in the higher income country when switching from autarky
to trade. This may make consumers in the higher income country worse o, depending on the
relative importance of product diversity and pro-competitive eects. In cases (III) and (IV), when
 is small and hH=hF is large enough, the sucient condition for no deviation is not satised and
hence PPE and FPE may not hold. Turning to the case of the exponential distribution, we can show
the following result.
Insert Figure 1 about here.
Proposition 7 Assume that Gr(hr) = 1   e rhr for country r = H;F , where the mean of each
distribution is given by hr  1=r. Then, the condition for the variety loss (16) and the sucient
condition (19) jointly hold when the share of population in country H, , is suciently large and the
relative average labor eciency satises
hH
hF
> 2 +
[+ cD(L)] f
cL
:
Proof. See Appendix H.
Note that this result for exponential distributions is consistent with that for point-mass distribu-
tions illustrated as \(II) shrink, no deviation" in Figure 1. We will show below that our numerical
illustrations are in accordance with these theoretical results.
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5 Numerical illustration
How many individuals in the higher income country may lose from trade? The answer hinges on the
distribution functions GH and GF . To illustrate the quantitative properties of our model, we now
compute the share of the U.S. population who lose from trade. In so doing, we rst use exponential
distributions for which we have obtained a sucient condition in terms of primitives.17 We then
check the robustness of our results by using non-parametric income distributions in Section 6.1. To
get clear-cut results, we rst analyze the case of hypothetical bilateral trade liberalization between
the U.S. and each of 188 countries, using 2005 data. We then turn to the case of multilateral trade
liberalization using the historical sequence of U.S. free trade agreements (FTAs) since 1985. A
detailed data description and information on the numerical procedure are relegated to Appendix J.
5.1 Bilateral trade liberalization
We rst illustrate the quantitative properties of our model in the case of bilateral trade liberalization.
Figure 2 depicts the relationship between the percentage of the U.S. population who lose from trade
and real GDP per capita of the trading partners for the case of exponential distributions. The
threshold GDP per capita of the trading partner below which we observe losses from trade for some
U.S. consumers is about $18,000. U.S. intra-industry trade with countries of similar GDP per capita
makes all individuals better o because it reduces the price-wage ratios and expands the range of
varieties consumed in both countries, as shown in Propositions 2 and 3. However, U.S. trade with
countries having lower GDP per capita may adversely aect up to 10% of the U.S. population.18 The
reason is that such trade reduces product diversity in consumption, although the price-wage ratios
decrease. As argued before, less diversity hurts mainly the higher income consumers, whereas lower
markups benet mostly the lower income consumers.
17Exponential distributions are a special case of Gamma distributions analyzed in Salem and Mount (1974), and
provide reasonable approximations of the U.S. income distribution (e.g., Dragulescu and Yakovenko, 2001).
18The condition in Proposition 5 is only sucient but not necessary for the symmetric price equilibrium. While the
sucient condition is useful for illustrating theoretical results, in the numerical analysis we rely on the more stringent
necessary and sucient condition r(ep)  r(p) for all ep  p. Figure 2 plots all the 143 countries for which that
condition is satised. See Appendix J for details on the necessary and sucient condition.
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Insert Figure 2 and Table 1 about here.
As seen from the top half of Table 1, the average share of U.S. losers increases monotonically
from about 0% to 9.66% as the average income of the trading partners decreases. Observe that 25
out of the 27 high income OECD trading partners lead to 0% of losers, whereas for the remaining
2 high income OECD countries (Hungary and Slovak Republic) the percentage of losers is almost
zero. Hence, U.S. intra-industry trade with high income OECD countries is benecial to almost all
U.S. consumers. Yet, trade with the upper middle income OECD countries (Mexico, Poland, and
Turkey) generates some losers with the percentage being between 0.23% and 1.96%.19
We have so far focused on the share of U.S. losers by assuming that the U.S. actually trades with
each trading partner. Whether or not the U.S. as a whole is likely to agree on free trade with each
potential trading partner is another interesting question. Needless to say, investigating that question
requires an assumption on the relevant political process. Although such an analysis is beyond the
scope of this paper, Table 1 shows that the share of potential losers is not overwhelming in all cases,
thus suggesting that U.S. intra-industry trade, even with highly dissimilar countries, need not require
protection.20
5.2 Multilateral trade liberalization
We next turn to multilateral trade to investigate how the historical sequence of U.S. FTAs, as
summarized in Table 2, has aected the individual welfare of the U.S. population. To this end, we
extend our model to a multi-country setting (see Appendix I, where we provide key expressions).
We start by examining the impacts of the U.S. FTA with Israel in 1985. We then consider how
the newly integrated economy is aected by the U.S. FTA with Canada in 1988; how the newly
integrated economy is aected by the entry of Mexico in 1994; and so on. We repeat this process of
19As seen from Table 1, the necessary and sucient condition for the symmetric price equilibrium is less likely to
hold when the trading partners are big and/or have low income. The average GDP per capita in countries satisfying
that condition is about $15,000, whereas that in the other countries is only about $1,400. Also, the former countries
are much smaller, with an average population of about 16 million against an average population of about 90 million.
20Consider, for example, a simple political process based on majority voting. Let bhH stand for the median of the
distribution GH . Then, comparing h
loss
H and
bhH , we see that free trade is the social outcome if and only if bhH < hlossH .
Clearly, this is always the case in Table 1.
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trade integration until 2009. At each step of the process, we analyze how U.S. varieties and markups
change, and who benets from those changes. However, there are usually several years between
successive FTAs, so that the growth of the U.S. population and of average labor eciency aect
welfare even when there are no additional FTAs. We eliminate these `growth eects', which are not
directly linked to FTAs, in order to highlight the impacts of adding new trading partners per se on
individual gains from trade.
Insert Table 2 about here.
Figure 3 shows the successive changes in individual welfare for selected percentiles of the U.S.
income distribution as compared to the base year 1985. Welfare changes in the sequence of U.S.
FTAs need not be monotone, and it is the lower income consumers who eventually have gained more
from these trade liberalizations. Observe that the 2001 FTA and the 2004 FTAs reduce the gains
from trade at the top of the U.S. income distribution (the top 5% in the 2001 FTA, and the top 1%
in the 2004 FTAs). Though the top 5% of agents still gain as compared to the initial situation in
1985, their gains would have been larger had either the 2001 or the 2004 FTAs not occurred. Observe
further that the U.S. FTA with Canada (a country of similar income) in 1988 benets mostly the
richer consumers, whereas the U.S. FTA with Mexico (a country of lower income) in 1994 benets
mostly the lower income consumers. As can be seen from Table 2, which summarizes the dierent
thresholds, hlossUS , and the percentages of losers, 100[1 GUS(hlossUS )], for the dierent FTAs, trade with
Mexico even hurts the very upper end of the U.S. income distribution (less than the top 1%).
Insert Figures 3 and 4 about here.
To illustrate our key mechanism, we decompose the welfare changes due to the FTA with Canada
into product diversity and pro-competitive eects, as given by (18), for selected percentiles of the U.S.
income distribution. Figure 4 shows that increased product diversity contributes 23.8% to the welfare
change at the median income level, whereas the remaining 76.2% arises from increased consumption
due to lower markups. The corresponding gures at the upper 5th percentile of the income distribu-
tion are 63.0% for product diversity and 37.0% for pro-competitive eects, respectively. Clearly, the
relative importance of product diversity increases with income.
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6 Robustness
We now show that our main results are robust when using non-parametric income distributions and
when extending the model to more than one sector.
6.1 Non-parametric income distributions
As a rst robustness check, we run our numerical simulations using non-parametric income distri-
butions. Doing so allows us to use more detailed information on the U.S. income distribution, and
to check how sensitive our results are to the choice of that distribution.21 More precisely, we use
information on annual income for about 33,000{55,000 U.S. full-time earner households from the
Current Population Survey (CPS) March Supplements between 1985 and 2009. See Appendix J for
additional details on data and the numerical implementation.
6.1.1 Bilateral trade liberalization
We rst consider bilateral trade liberalization in the non-parametric case using the same year 2005 and
the same 188 trading partners as in Section 5.1. Figure 5 and Table 1 show that our results are robust.
In particular, Table 1 shows that the average share of losers in the U.S. increases monotonically as
the average income of the trading partners decreases. The shares of losers under the non-parametric
distribution tend to be smaller than the corresponding shares under the exponential distribution
when considering trade with low income countries, whereas the reverse holds for trade with high
income countries. Yet, the correlation between the shares of losers in the exponential case and those
in the non-parametric case exceeds 0.98. When focusing on the trading partners that generate U.S.
losers, the average share of losers in the U.S. is 4.77% in the exponential case, while that in the
non-parametric case is 3.03%.
Insert Figures 5{7 about here.
21Our results are also robust when using the Gamma and Lognormal distributions (available upon request).
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6.1.2 Multilateral trade liberalization
We next consider multilateral trade liberalization using the historical sequence of U.S. FTAs and
the CPS household income distribution in each year. Figures 6 and 7 show that our qualitative and
quantitative results are almost unchanged. In particular, the entry of Canada in 1988 (resp., Mexico
in 1994) benets mostly the higher (resp., lower) income consumers in the U.S. The entry of Mexico
reduces the mass of varieties consumed, so that the richer consumers in the U.S. lose from trade
integration with Mexico.22 This is not visible from Figure 6 since the income level of the losers is
beyond the 1st percentile of the income distribution, as reported in Table 2. The overall conclusion
that the lower income consumers gain more between 1985 and 2009 remains unchanged.23
6.2 Multiple sectors
One may argue that our single-sector results do not hold in a setting with multiple sectors as con-
sumers who lose from less varieties in one sector may still gain because they benet from lower
markups in other sectors. We now show that this need not be the case. More precisely, some
consumers may still lose overall, even though they gain in other sectors.
6.2.1 Model
To see this, we embed income heterogeneity in the two-sector model of Behrens and Murata (2012).
Denoting the two sectors by 1 and 2, the problem of a consumer with income Er(hr) is given by:
max Ur  U(U1r; U2r) s:t:
Z

1r
p1r(i)q1r(i)di+
Z

2r
p2r(j)q2r(j)dj = Er(hr);
with U1r 
R

1r
[1  e 1q1r(i)]di and U2r 
R

2r
[1  e 2q2r(j)]dj. Assume, without loss of generality,
that 1 > 2. We can derive the demands as follows:
q1r(i; hr) =
1
1
ln

1r(hr)
p1r(i)

and q2r(j; hr) =
1
2
ln

2r(hr)
p2r(j)

; (20)
22The same results hold for the Gamma and Lognormal distributions (available upon request).
23Contrary to the exponential case, the necessary and sucient condition in Appendix J holds for all years in the
non-parametric case. We thus simulate the model until 2009, when the FTAs with Peru and Oman took eect.
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where the reservation prices 1r(hr) and 2r(hr) are dierent across consumers but common to all
rms in the same industry. The expressions of the reservation prices are as follows:
1r(hr)  e
1Er(hr)
Pr +
Hr
Pr  
1
2Pr
ln

2
1
@Ur=@U2r
@Ur=@U1r
 R

2r
p2r(j)dj (21)
2r(hr)  e
1Er(hr)
Pr +
Hr
Pr +
1
Pr ln

2
1
@Ur=@U2r
@Ur=@U1r
 R

1r
p1r(i)di; (22)
where Pr 
R

1r
p1r(i)di + (1=2)
R

2r
p2r(j)dj is the sum of prices and Hr 
R

1r
p1r(i) ln p1r(i)di
+(1=2)
R

2r
p2r(j) ln p2r(j)dj is a measure of price dispersion in the two-sector economy.
Assume that each rm serves all consumers in both countries under free trade (see Appendix J
for the necessary and sucient condition). The aggregate demand for variety i of sector 1 produced
in country r is given by:
Q1r(i) = Lr
Z
q1r(i; hr)dGr(hr) + Ls
Z
q1s(i; hs)dGs(hs)
=
Lr
1
Z
ln

1r(hr)
p1r(i)

dGr(hr) +
Ls
1
Z
ln

1s(hs)
p1r(i)

dGs(hs) =
Lr + Ls
1
[1   ln(p1r(i))] ;
where 1 
R
ln(1r(hr))dGr(hr) +
R
ln(1s(hs))dGs(hs). Since 1 is taken as given by each rm,
the own-price derivative is equal to  (Lr + Ls)=(1p1r(i)). Each rm maximizes prots, and the
rst-order condition is given by:
@1r(i)
@p1r(i)
=
Lr + Ls
1

1   ln(p1r(i))  p1r(i)  cwr
p1r(i)

= 0: (23)
Solving condition (23), we then get the prot-maximizing price as follows:
p1r(i) =
cwr
W1r
; with W1r = W

e
cwr
e1

; (24)
where W denotes the Lambert W function (see Behrens and Murata, 2012). Mirror expressions hold
for sector 2. In what follows, we thus only give expressions for sector 1. Expression (24) shows that
the price equilibrium within each sector in each country is symmetric, since 1 and marginal cost
cwr are common to all rms within the same sector in the same country.
Plugging the prot-maximizing price (24) into the rst-order condition (23), we get Q1r(i) =
[(Lr + Ls)=1] [1 W1r], which then implies that
1r(i) =
(Lr + Ls)cwr
1

1
W1r
+W1r   2

  fwr:
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We then can easily solve the zero prot condition for W1r as follows:
W1r = 1 
p
41cf(Lr + Ls) + (1f)2   1f
2c(Lr + Ls)
:
As can be seen from the foregoing expression, W1r = W1s = W1, so that wr = ws = w and
p1r = p1s = p1 from (24). In words, PPE and FPE hold.
To solve for the equilibrium, we have to specify the upper-tier utility Ur. Assume that Ur 
1 lnU1r + 2 lnU2r, with 1; 2 > 0 and 1 + 2 = 1. Let r(hr) denote the budget share of a
consumer with labor eciency hr, allocated to the consumption of good 1. Let also N1  n1r + n1s
and N2  n2r + n2s denote the masses of varieties in sectors 1 and 2, respectively. As the price
equilibrium is symmetric within each sector, we then have q1r(hr) = r(hr)whr=(N1p1) and q2r(hr) =
(1  r(hr))whr=(N2p2). Labor market clearing in country r requires that
Lrhr = 1

W1Lr
Z
r(hr)hrdGr(hr) +W1Ls
Z
s(hs)hsdGs(hs) +N1f

(25)
+2

W2Lr
Z
(1  r(hr))hrdGr(hr) +W2Ls
Z
(1  s(hs))hsdGs(hs) +N2f

;
where we have used the price equilibrium (24), and where 1  n1r=N1 and 2  n2r=N2 denote the
share of sector 1 rms and that of sector 2 rms in country r.
Using the same notation as above, the trade balance condition is given by:
Lr

(1  1)
Z
r(hr)hrdGr(hr) + (1  2)
Z
(1  r(hr))hrdGr(hr)

= Ls

1
Z
s(hs)hsdGs(hs) + 2
Z
(1  s(hs))hsdGs(hs)

: (26)
Market clearing for good 1 can also be written in terms of r(hr) and s(hs) as follows:
LrW1
N1c
Z
r(hr)hrdGr(hr) +
LsW1
N1c
Z
s(hs)hsdGs(hs) =
Lr + Ls
1
(1 W1): (27)
Finally, using the denition of r(hr), as well as the expression of (@Ur=@U2r)=(@Ur=@U1r), demand
q1r(hr) for a consumer with labor eciency hr can be rewritten as
r(hr)whr
N1p1
=
whr
P
  1
1
ln p1 +
H
1P
  N2p2
2P
ln
8><>:2211
N1
h
1  e 1 r(hr)whrN1p1
i
N2
h
1  e 2 (1 r(hr))whrN2p2
i
9>=>; : (28)
The general equilibrium of the two-sector model is given by the labor market clearing condition
(25) for both countries r and s; by the trade balance condition (26); by the good market clearing
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condition (27); and by the consumers' cross-sector expenditure allocation conditions (28). Note that
the last condition must hold for all hr in country r and all hs in country s. Put dierently, we have
to solve for the four variables 1, 2, N1 and N2, as well as the two distributions r(hr) and s(hs).
Solving for the latter two when Gr and Gs are continuous is not analytically feasible and poses
numerical problems due to a continuum of equilibrium conditions. We hence discretize the model
by replacing the integral expressions by discrete summations, and simulate it on discretized income
distributions for both the U.S. and its trading partners. To make our results comparable to those
of the single sector case, we restrict ourselves to discretized exponential distributions.24 For each
distribution, we compute all income percentiles. We then associate the population of each percentile
with the average income computed from that percentile. This discretization allows us to simulate
the model while keeping the average income in each country at its observed level. Let r(hir) denote
the expenditure share on good 1 in country r for the ith income percentile. The general equilibrium
then consists of 204 equations in 204 unknowns (1, 2, N1, N2, fr(hir)gi=1;:::;100, fs(hjs)gj=1;:::;100).
Appendix J provides additional details on the numerical implementation of the multi-sector case.
6.2.2 Numerical illustration
We illustrate the multi-sector model using bilateral trade between the U.S. and Brazil in 2005. Our
choice is motivated by the fact that this example displays various impacts of trade on individual
welfare across the U.S. income distribution. Unlike in the single-sector case, we can now decompose
gains from trade on a sector-by-sector basis. Depending on an individual's position in the U.S.
income distribution, s/he may: (i) gain in both sectors; (ii) gain in one sector, but lose in the other,
with the overall welfare change being positive; (iii) gain in one sector, but lose in the other, with
the overall welfare change being negative; or (iv) lose in both sectors. We will show when each case
arises in our example.
As explained in Section 6.2.1, we discretize exponential income distributions for both the U.S.
and Brazil at each percentile. Using those discretized distributions, we then compute the equilibrium
under both free trade and autarky to evaluate the changes in varieties and markups in each sector.
Finally, we can compute, for each income percentile, the welfare change in each sector as well as the
24The qualitative results do not change when using the non-parametric distributions.
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overall welfare change.
Insert Figure 8 about here.
Figure 8, where each bullet corresponds to a percentile of the U.S. income distribution, displays
the four cases explained above. First, for all consumers below the top 5% of the income distribution,
gains from trade are positive in each sector. The reason is that, although consumption diversity
shrinks, markups fall too, and the lower the income, the more important the price changes are for
welfare as compared to the variety changes. Second, for all consumers between the top 4{5%, overall
welfare gains are still positive. Although these consumers lose from reduced product diversity in
sector 1 (the high  sector), gains in sector 2 due to lower markups more than compensate for the
losses in sector 1. Third, for all consumers at the top 3%, overall welfare gains are negative, because
losses from trade in sector 1 are not oset by gains in sector 2. Last, the top 1{2% consumers
unambiguously lose from trade in both sectors as reduced diversity in each sector is not compensated
by lower markups.
7 Concluding remarks
Globalization is widely believed to yield gains from trade at the aggregate level, yet produces winners
and losers at the individual level. In this paper, we have analyzed the impact of globalization on
individual gains from trade in a general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition featuring
income heterogeneity between and within countries. We have shown that, although trade always
reduces markups in both countries, its impact on product diversity in consumption depends on
their relative position in the world income distribution. The range of varieties consumed in the
lower income country always expands, while that in the higher income country may shrink. When
the latter occurs, it is the richer consumers in the higher income country who may lose from trade
because the relative importance of variety versus quantity increases with income. We have illustrated
the quantitative properties of our model using data on GDP per capita and population, as well as on
the U.S. income distribution. It turns out that U.S. bilateral trade with countries of similar GDP per
capita makes all individuals in both countries better o, whereas trade with countries having lower
GDP per capita may adversely aect up to 10% of the U.S. population. Interestingly, our analysis
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of the sequence of U.S. FTAs further suggests that trade with Canada benets mostly the richer
consumers in the U.S., the entry of Mexico benets mostly the lower income consumers in the U.S.,
and that it is the lower income consumers who eventually gain more from these trade liberalizations.
To focus entirely on how globalization aects individual welfare through product diversity and
pro-competitive eects, we have developed a highly stylized model. The following two points should
therefore be kept in mind. First, our analysis abstracts from the role of factor endowments in
determining individual welfare. However, when there is more than one factor, for instance, skilled
and unskilled workers, factor proportions theory generally predicts that skilled workers in a skill
abundant country gain from trade, whereas the unskilled in that country lose. Second, to restrict
ourselves to the interaction of income heterogeneity and variable demand elasticities, we have forgone
rm heterogeneity. Yet, trade liberalization shifts demand towards larger rms, which tend to employ
more skilled people and pay higher wages. Our results suggest that the welfare changes driven by these
within-industry reallocations and by Stolper-Samuelson eects may get weakened or even reversed
when product diversity, pro-competitive eects, and income heterogeneity are jointly taken into
account. Ultimately, trade may not generate as much inequality in individual welfare as predicted
by rm heterogeneity and factor proportions theories. Introducing all of these elements into a single
framework appears to be a daunting but promising extension in order to get a fuller picture of the
impact of globalization on individual gains from trade.
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Figure 1: Product diversity in country H and no-deviation condition when populations are homoge-
neous within each country
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Figure 2: Percentage of losers in the U.S. (exponential distribution, 2005)
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Figure 3: U.S. individual gains from trade in the historical sequence of U.S. FTAs (exponential
distributions)
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Figure 4: Relative importance of variety versus quantity for the U.S. population { U.S. FTA with
Canada in 1988 (exponential distribution)
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Figure 5: Percentage of losers in the U.S. (non-parametric distribution, 2005)
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Figure 6: U.S. individual gains from trade in the historical sequence of U.S. FTAs (non-parametric
distributions)
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Figure 7: Relative importance of variety versus quantity for the U.S. population { U.S. FTA with
Canada in 1988 (non-parametric distribution)
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Figure 8: U.S. individual gains from trade with Brazil (two sectors, discretized exponential distribu-
tion, 2005)
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Table 1: Summary statistics by World Bank country classications for our 2005 sample
Income class
High: OECD High Upper middle Lower middle Low
Distribution 27 countries 21 countries 39 countries 51 countries 45 countries
Exponential avg share of U.S. losers 0.00% 0.03% 2.52% 6.38% 9.66%
# partners generating U.S. losers / 2/27 4/21 39/39 43/43 9/9
# partners NSC holds
NSC does hold 100% 100% 100% 84% 20%
NSC violated 0% 0% 0% 16% 80%
Non-parametric avg share of U.S. losers 0.00% 0.11% 1.76% 3.36% 5.11%
(CPS March) # partners generating U.S. losers / 2/27 4/21 38/39 47/47 22/22
# partners NSC holds
NSC does hold 100% 100% 100% 92% 49%
NSC violated 0% 0% 0% 8% 51%
Mean gdpc Mean pop
Exponential NSC does hold 15405.61 16526.89
NSC violated 1372.52 89032.18
Non-parametric NSC does hold 13922.51 16294.63
(CPS March) NSC violated 1327.27 134380.40
Notes: We classify countries according to the 2005 revision of the World Bank using their GNI per capita for the Bank's scal year
2005. Data for six countries (Bermuda, Iraq, Puerto Rico, Qatar, Somalia and Taiwan) is missing, and we hence drop those countries
from this table. gdpc refers to GDP per capita in current US dollars. pop refers to population in 1000s. NSC refers to the necessary
and sucient condition for the symmetric price equilibrium given in Appendix J.
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Table 2: The sequence of U.S. FTAs and percentage of losers in the U.S.
Partner countries Dates Thresholds Exponential Non-parametric (CPS March)
% U.S. losers % U.S. losers
hlossUS 100[1 GUS(hlossUS )] 100[1 GUS(hlossUS )]
Israel 08/19/1985 1 0 0
Canada 10/04/1988 superseded by NAFTA 1 0 0
Mexico 01/01/1994 235631 0.54 0.03
Jordan 12/17/2001 141674 10.3 5.37
Chile 01/01/2004 262878 2.15 1.71
Singapore 01/01/2004
Costa Rica 08/05/2004 part of CAFTA-DR
Dominican Rep. 08/05/2004 part of CAFTA-DR
El Salvador 08/05/2004 part of CAFTA-DR
Guatemala 08/05/2004 part of CAFTA-DR
Honduras 08/05/2004 part of CAFTA-DR
Nicaragua 08/05/2004 part of CAFTA-DR
Australia 01/01/2005 1 0 0
Morocco 01/01/2006 148933 NSC does not hold 7.55
Bahrain 08/01/2006
Oman 01/01/2009 314594 NSC does not hold 2.16
Peru 02/01/2009
Notes: Since we use yearly data on GDP per capita and population, we consider U.S. multilateral trade with Chile, Singapore,
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua simultaneously without taking into account
their ordering within the year 2004. The numbers reported for Chile apply to all of these countries. We do the same for 2006
when Morocco and Bahrain entered, as well as for 2009 when Oman and Peru entered. In all years, the necessary and sucient
condition (NSC) in Appendix J is satised for the non-parametric case. In the exponential case, the NSC is not satised for
2006{2009.
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Appendix A: Derivation of the demand functions
Let  denote the Lagrange multiplier. The rst-order conditions for an interior solution are
e qrr(i;hr) = pr(i); 8i 2 
r (A.1)
e qsr(j;hr) = ps(j); 8j 2 
s (A.2)
and the budget constraintZ

r
pr(k)qrr(k; hr)dk +
Z

s
ps(k)qsr(k; hr)dk = Er(hr): (A.3)
Taking the ratio of (A.1) with respect to i and j, we obtain
qrr(i; hr) = qrr(j; hr) +
1

ln

pr(j)
pr(i)

8i; j 2 
r:
Multiplying this expression by pr(j) and integrating with respect to j 2 
r we obtain
qrr(i; hr)
Z

r
pr(j)dj =
Z

r
pr(j)qrr(j; hr)dj +
1

Z

r
ln

pr(j)
pr(i)

pr(j)dj: (A.4)
Analogously, taking the ratio of (A.1) and (A.2) with respect to i and j, we get:
qrr(i; hr) = qsr(j; hr) +
1

ln

ps(j)
pr(i)

8i 2 
r; 8j 2 
s:
Multiplying this expression by ps(j) and integrating with respect to j 2 
s we obtain
qrr(i; hr)
Z

s
ps(j)dj =
Z

s
ps(j)qsr(j; hr)dj +
1

Z

s
ln

ps(j)
pr(i)

ps(j)dj: (A.5)
Summing expressions (A.4) and (A.5), and using the budget constraint (A.3), we nally obtain the
demands (1). The derivation of the demands (2) is analogous.
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 1
Using (1), (2) and the denition of output per rm, it is readily veried that
QH(i) QF (j) =  L

ln

pH(i)
pF (j)

: (B.1)
41
Because each individual is assumed to consume all varieties, the rst-order conditions (5) must hold
for all rms in countries H and F . Using expression (B.1), one can check that
@H(i)
@pH(i)
  @F (j)
@pF (j)
= 0 () c

wH
pH(i)
  wF
pF (j)

= ln

pH(i)
pF (j)

: (B.2)
Furthermore, from expression (4) the zero prot condition requires that
r(i)
wr
=

pr(i)
wr
  c

Qr(i)  f = 0 for r = H;F:
Assume that there exists i 2 
H and j 2 
F such that pH(i) > pF (j). Then (B.2) implies that
wH=pH(i) > wF=pF (j) or, equivalently, that pH(i)=wH < pF (j)=wF ; whereas (B.1) implies that
QH(i) < QF (j). Hence, H(i)=wH < F (j)=wF , which is incompatible with the zero prot condition
at least in one country. We thus conclude that pH(i) = pF (j) must hold for all i 2 
H and j 2 
F ,
which shows that product prices are equalized. Expression (B.2) then shows that wH = wF , i.e.,
factor prices are equalized whenever product prices are equalized. Finally, setting pr(i) = ps(j) = p
and wr = ws = w in (5) yields expression (9).
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 2
Since by assumption hF  h  hH and maxfLH ; LFg < L, expressions (12) and (15) reveal that
N > naF , whereas N T naH if and only if hHD(LH) S hD(L), which establishes (i). Comparing (10)
and (13) establishes (iii) because (12) and (15) imply hr=n
a
r > h=N for r = H;F . By (11) and (14),
this implies that nr < n
a
r for r = H;F , thus proving (ii).
Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 2 shows that when hH = hF = h, trade always expands product diversity in consumption,
which raises welfare via `love-of-variety' as follows. Given the price-wage ratio under free trade, we
have Ur(hr) = N [1  e whr=(Np)] and @Ur(hr)=@N = 1  e whr=(Np)[1 + whr=(Np)] > 0 for all N
and r = H;F . To obtain the last inequality, let z  whr=(Np) and (z)  1  e z(1 + z). Clearly,
(0) = 0 and 0(z) > 0 for all z > 0, which shows that for any given price-wage ratio under free
trade, utility increases in the mass of varieties consumed. Hence, the rst term in (18) is positive.
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Similarly, by Proposition 2, we know that for any given mass of rms under autarky, the price-wage
ratio falls under free trade, thus implying that the second term in (18) is also positive.
Appendix E: Proof of Proposition 4
The rst part of Proposition 4 can be established as follows. When condition (16) holds, free trade
reduces the mass of varieties consumed in country H, while the price-wage ratio decreases. Hence,
two opposing eects are at work and the overall outcome is a priori ambiguous. In general, it will
depend on the value of hH . To see this, we proceed as follows. First, evaluating (18) at the price
equilibrium and at the equilibrium mass of rms, and dierentiating the resulting expression with
respect to hH , it is veried that
@ (UH(hH))
@hH
=
N
h+ cN
exp

  hH
h+ cN

  n
a
H
hH + cnaH
exp

  hH
hH + cnaH

(E.1)
and that
@ (UH(hH))
@hH

hH=0
> 0 () N
naH
=
[+ cD(L)]h
[+ cD(LH)]hH
>
h
hH
; (E.2)
which always holds. This establishes that UH is positively sloped at hH = 0. Second, note that the
derivative (E.1) has a unique root, which is given by
hextH =
(h+ cN)(hH + cn
a
H)
[(hH   h) + c(naH  N)]
ln

hHN + cn
a
HN
hnaH + cn
a
HN

;
such that hextH > 0 if and only if (hH   h) + c (naH  N) > 0. Third, since
sgn
"
@2(UH(hH))
@h2H

hH=h
ext
H
#
= sgn
  (hH   h) + c(naH  N)	 ;
the associated extremum is: (i) a local maximum when hextH > 0; and (ii) a local minimum when
hextH < 0. We now analyze these two cases.
Case (i): hextH > 0: Two sub-cases may emerge. First, when (16) holds, we have N < n
a
H , which
then implies that limhH!1UH(hH) = N naH < 0. In this case, there exists a unique threshold hlossH
such that UH(hH) T 0 for hH S hlossH , since (E.2) and UH(0) = 0 hold and UH is continuous in
hH . Second, when (16) does not hold, we have N > n
a
H . In this case, free trade raises the welfare
of all consumers in country H through increased product diversity (N > naH) and lower price-wage
ratios (p=w < paH=w
a
H).
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Case (ii): hextH < 0: Since (E.2) and UH(0) = 0 hold and UH is continuous and strictly
increasing for all hH  0, all individuals in country H gain from trade.
The second part of Proposition 4 directly result from the expansion of product diversity in consump-
tion (N > naF ) and the decrease in the price-wage ratios (p=w < p
a
F=w
a
F ).
Appendix F: Proof of Proposition 5
We derive a sucient condition for the symmetric price p, as given by (9), to be a price equilibrium in
the presence of income heterogeneity and nite marginal utility at zero consumption.25 To alleviate
notation, we suppress subscripts whenever there is no possible confusion.
Taking into account the fact that demands need not be strictly positive, aggregate demand is
given by Qr(i) = Lr
R1
0
max f0; qrr(i; hr)g dGr(hr) +Ls
R1
0
max f0; qrs(i; hs)g dGs(hs). Assume that
one rm charges the price ep, whereas all the other rms charge the price p given by (9). Since
the deviating rm is negligible to the market, wages are unaected and remain equalized between
the two countries. Noting that the labor eciencies of the marginal consumers, eh, must satisfy
qrr(ep;eh) = qrs(ep;eh) = 0, we have
eh  max0; Np
w
ln
ep
p

: (F.1)
We can then rewrite the aggregate demand of the deviating rm as follows:
Qr(ep) = Lr Z 1eh qrr(ep; hr)dGr(hr) + Ls
Z 1
eh qrs(ep; hs)dGs(hs): (F.2)
Dierentiating (F.2) with respect to ep and applying the Leibniz integral rule, we get:
Q0r(ep) = Lr Z 1eh @qrr(ep; hr)@ep dGr(hr) + Ls
Z 1
eh
@qrs(ep; hs)
@ep dGs(hs); (F.3)
where we have used the properties qrr(ep;eh) = qrs(ep;eh) = 0. The operating prot of the deviating
rm is given by r(ep) = (ep   cw)Qr(ep). Imposing symmetry on prices and quantities, as well as on
their derivatives, we then have
qrr(ep; hr) = whr
Np
  1

ln
ep
p

;
@qrr(ep; hr)
@ep =   1ep (F.4)
qrs(ep; hs) = whs
Np
  1

ln
ep
p

;
@qrs(ep; hs)
@ep =   1ep  (F.5)
25See Saint-Paul (2006) for a similar analysis of this problem in the context of a closed economy.
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Plugging (F.4) and (F.5) into (F.2) and (F.3), we get
Qr(ep) = w
Np

Lr
Z 1
eh hr dGr(hr) + Ls
Z 1
eh hs dGs(hs)

  1

ln
ep
p

Lr
Z 1
eh dGr(hr) + Ls
Z 1
eh dGs(hs)

(F.6)
Q0r(ep) =   1ep

Lr
Z 1
eh dGr(hr) + Ls
Z 1
eh dGs(hs)

:
We now classify all possible deviations from symmetry into two cases: (i) ep < p and (ii) ep > p.
Case (i): ep < p: From expression (F.1), we obtain eh = 0. Hence, a unilateral deviation with a
lower price is not protable since for any ep < p we have
@r(ep)
@ep = L

wh
Np
  1

ln
ep
p

  ep  cw
ep

> L

wh
Np
  1

ln
ep
p

  p  cw
p

=  L

ln
ep
p

> 0;
where we have used the denition of p in the last step.
Case (ii): ep > p: Given the result in case (i), a sucient condition for (9) to be a symmetric price
equilibrium is that @r(ep)=@ep  0 for all ep > p, which can be expressed as follows:
w
Np

Lr
Z 1
eh hr dGr(hr) + Ls
Z 1
eh hs dGs(hs)



1

ln
ep
p

+
ep  cw
ep
 
Lr
Z 1
eh dGr(hr) + Ls
Z 1
eh dGs(hs)

for all ep > p. Using (F.1), and because ep > p, the condition can be rewritten as
Lr
Z 1
eh hr dGr(hr) + Ls
Z 1
eh hs dGs(hs) 
eh+ Np
w

1  cwep

Lr
Z 1
eh dGr(hr) + Ls
Z 1
eh dGs(hs)

for all ep > p. Since (F.1) implies that eh > 0 when ep > p, and that p=ep = e weh=(Np), we obtain

R1eh hr dGr(hr) + (1  ) R1eh hs dGs(hs)

R1eh dGr(hr) + (1  ) R1eh dGs(hs)  eh+ Npw   cN e w
eh
Np
for all eh > 0, where we have used the denition of the population share . Using p = [c+ (h=N)]w,
q(p;eh) = weh=(Np) and the expression of the utility function, we then obtain
h

heh  eh+ h+ cU(eh); 8eh > 0: (F.7)
Finally, noting that U(eh) = N [1  e weh=(Np)] = hD(L)f1  e (eh=h)=[+cD(L)]g, we prove the claim.
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Appendix G: Proof of Proposition 6
We rst restate the sucient condition for the symmetric price equilibrium (19). As shown in
Appendix F, a unilateral deviation is possibly protable only when the rm can aect the marginal
consumer. Since the density function has a point-mass at hr when populations are homogeneous
within each country, the mass of individuals with positive demand changes at hF and hH . Because
hF  hH by assumption, three cases may arise: (i) eh 2 (0; hF ), where all consumers have positive
demand; (ii) eh 2 [hF ; hH), where only consumers in country H have positive demand; and (iii)eh 2 [hH ;1), where no consumer has positive demand.
Obviously, there is no incentive for the rm to deviate from the symmetric price p to the prices
corresponding to cases (i) and (iii). This is because the deviating rm cannot change the mass of
consumers it faces in case (i), whereas in case (iii) it faces zero demand. In what follows, we thus
focus on case (ii), i.e., the case where the rm can exclude consumers in country F by changing
its price.26 Since the demand functions are dierentiable with respect to ep when eh 2 [hF ; hH), the
sucient condition for a symmetric price equilibrium given in (F.7) can be rewritten as:
hH  eh+ h+ c

U(eh); 8eh 2 [hF ; hH): (G.1)
Note that condition (G.1) is satised when
1  hH
hF
 2  
1    ();
where we use the more stringent condition hH  hF + h < eh + h + (c=)U(eh) for all eh 2 [hF ; hH).
Expression (16), in turn, requires that
hH
hF
>
(1  )D(L)
D(L)  D(L)  	():
Noting that lim!0() = 2, lim!1() = 1, lim!0	() = 1, lim!1	() = 2 + [ +
cD(L)]f=(cL), and that  is increasing whereas 	 is decreasing in  2 [0; 1],  and 	 cross only
once for  2 [0; 1].27 Based on these observations, we obtain the claim and can draw Figure 1.
26The case (ii) does not arise when hF = hH , so that the price equilibrium is symmetric.
27Observe that 	 is decreasing in  2 [0; 1] because 	 is convex and lim!1	0() < 0.
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Appendix H: Proof of Proposition 7
We prove Proposition 7 in three steps. First, the left-hand side of the sucient condition (19) can
be rewritten as a weighted average of the tail conditional expectations:28
eR1eh hH dGH(hH)
1 GH(eh) + (1  e)
R1eh hF dGF (hF )
1 GF (eh) ;
where
e  [1 GH(eh)]
[1 GH(eh)] + (1  )[1 GF (eh)] 2 (0; 1):
Second, consider the exponential distributions Gr(hr) = 1  e rhr for r = H;F , where the mean
of each distribution is given by hr  1=r. In the exponential case, the tail conditional expectations
are additively separable with respect to the threshold eh and the mean hr as follows (see Theorem 2
of Landsman and Valdez, 2005, which provides an important \if and only if" relationship between
this additive separability and exponential distributions):R1eh hH dGH(hH)
1 GH(eh) = eh+ hH and
R1eh hF dGF (hF )
1 GF (eh) = eh+ hF : (H.1)
Hence, using (H.1), the sucient condition can be rewritten as ehH + (1   e)hF  h + (c=)U(eh),
8eh > 0, which, using h  hH + (1  )hF , boils down to (e   )(hH   hF )  (c=)U(eh), 8eh > 0, or
(1  ) e
 Heh   e Feh
e Heh + (1  )e Feh (hH   hF ) 
c

U(eh); 8eh > 0: (H.2)
Finally, using the denition of the hyperbolic tangent, given by:
tanh

F   H
2
eh  e(F H)eh   1
e(F H)eh + 1 ;
the sucient condition (H.2) can be rewritten as
(1  )
 +
1  2
e(F H)eh + 1
(hH   hF )  c

U(eh)
tanh

F   H
2
eh ; 8eh > 0: (H.3)
The behavior of the left-hand side of (H.3) depends on the sign of 1   2. We therefore classify all
possible cases into two: (i) 0    1=2; and (ii) 1=2 <   1.
28The properties of the tail conditional expectations for various distributions have recently been explored in the
nance literature (see, e.g., Landsman and Valdez, 2005; Dhaene et al., 2006).
47
Case (i): 0    1=2: In this case, the left-hand side is bounded from above as follows:
(1  )
 +
1  2
e(F H)eh + 1
(hH   hF )  (1  )(hH   hF ); 8eh > 0:
Accordingly, the sucient condition becomes
(1  )(hH   hF )  c

U(eh)
tanh

F   H
2
eh ; 8eh > 0;
where the left-hand side is independent of eh, and both U(eh) and tanh((F   H)eh=2) are strictly
increasing in eh. Furthermore, taking the limit of the right-hand side, we have
limeh!0
c

U(eh)
tanh

F   H
2
eh =
2hHhF
hH   hF
cD(L)
+ cD(L)
> 0:
Since tanh((F   H)eh=2) 2 (0; 1] and U(eh) > 0 for all eh > 0, the right-hand side of the sucient
condition is bounded from below and strictly positive regardless of the value of eh. Therefore, for
given values of h and L, we can always choose a suciently small value of (1  )(hH  hF ) > 0 such
that the sucient condition is satised for all eh > 0.
Hence, when 0    1=2, the smaller the size of the trading partner 1   , the more likely the
sucient condition is to be satised. Furthermore, the smaller the gap between hH and hF , the
more likely the sucient condition is to be satised. Note that, for a given value of h, a mean-
preserving contraction (that reduces the gap between hH and hF , keeping h constant) does not aect
U(eh), whereas it reduces tanh((F   H)eh=2), thus increasing the right-hand side of the sucient
condition.29 At the same time, such a mean-preserving contraction reduces the left-hand side.
Case (ii): 1=2 <   1: Again, the left-hand side is bounded from above as follows:
(1  )
 +
1  2
e(F H)eh + 1
(hH   hF )  2(1  )(hH   hF ); 8eh > 0:
29To see this, consider the following minimization problem
min F   H = 1
hF
  1
hH
s.t. hH + (1  )hF = h:
Since hF = (1=(1  ))(h  hH), we can plug the constraint into the objective function. Then, it is veried that the
objective function is increasing in hH 2 (hF ; h=), where the upper bound corresponds to the case with hF ! 0.
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Accordingly, the sucient condition becomes
2(1  )(hH   hF )  c

U(eh)
tanh

F   H
2
eh ; 8eh > 0;
where the left-hand side is independent of eh. By the same argument as in case (i), when 1=2 <   1,
the smaller the trading partner (or the smaller the gap between hH and hF ), the more likely the
sucient condition is to be satised.
We nally address when the condition for the variety loss (16) and the sucient condition (19)
jointly hold in equilibrium (in terms of \fundamentals"). Expression (16) requires that
hH
hF
>
(1  )D(L)
D(L)  D(L)  	():
Taking the limit of this expression, we know that
lim
!1
hH
hF
=
hH
hF
> 2 +
[+ cD(L)] f
cL
= lim
!1
	()
must hold for the variety loss to occur in countryH in the limit. This is compatible with the sucient
condition since as  goes to 1, we have
lim
!1
2(1  )(hH   hF ) = 0 < lim
!1
c

U(eh)
tanh

F   H
2
eh =
c

hHD(L)

1  e 

+cD(L)
eh
hH

tanh

F   H
2
eh ; 8eh > 0:
Put dierently, the condition for the variety loss and the sucient condition jointly hold when country
H is suciently large relative to country F , i.e.,  ! 1, and the average labor eciency of country
H relative to that of country F is high enough to satisfy
hH
hF
> 2 +
[+ cD(L)] f
cL
:
Appendix I: Key expressions of the model for the multi-
country case
In this appendix, we provide key expressions for the model with multiple countries. All expressions
are straightforward generalizations of the ones established with two countries. The utility and the
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budget constraint are given by:
Ur =
X
s
Z

sr

1  e qsr(i) di and X
s
Z

sr
psr(i)qsr(i)di = Er(hr):
This yields the demand functions
qsr(i) =
Er(hr)
Pr
  1
Pr
X
t
Z

tr
ln

psr(i)
ptr(j)

ptr(j)dj;
where Pr =
P
s
R

sr
psr(i)di is the average price in country r. Under PPE and FPE, Pr will be the
same everywhere. Let
Qr(i) =
X
s
Qrs(i) =
X
s
Ls
Z
qrs(i; hs)dGs(hs)
denote the aggregate demand faced by rm i located in country r. From r(i) = [pr(i)  cwr]Qr(i) 
fwr, the rst-order conditions are given by:
@r(i)
@pr(i)
= Qr(i) + [pr(i)  cwr]@Qr(i)
@pr(i)
= 0; (I.1)
where
@Qr(i)
@pr(i)
=
X
s
Ls
Z
@qrs(i)
@pr(i)
dGs(hs) =  
P
s Ls
pr(i)
:
Under PPE and FPE, the aggregate demand can be written as
Q =
 X
s
Lshs
!
w
Np
: (I.2)
The rst-order conditions (I.1) then yield the following price equilibrium:
@r(i)
@pr(i)
=
 X
s
Lshs
!
w
Np
  L(p  cw)
p
= 0 ) p =

1 +

P
s shs
cN

cw;
where L =
P
s Ls, N =
P
s ns and s = Ls=L. The labor market clearing condition can then be
rewritten as ns (cQ+ f) = Lshs. Summing this expression over s we have N (cQ+ f) =
P
s Lshs.
Substituting the aggregate demand (I.2), it is readily veried that
N =
P
s Lshs
f

1  cw
p

: (I.3)
Evaluating (I.3) at the price equilibrium and solving for N then yields N =
 P
s shs

D(L). Since
nr(cQ+f) = Lrhr must hold from the labor market clearing condition, it follows by summing across
countries and taking the ratio that
nr(cQ+ f)
N(cQ+ f)
=
nr
N
=
LrhrP
s Lshs
: (I.4)
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Using the expression for N , (I.4) then yields
nr =
LrhrP
s Lshs
D(L)
X
s
shs = rhrD(L):
Finally, one can check that the no-deviation condition can now be expressed as follows:
h

heh  eh+ h+ cU(eh); 8eh > 0; where h heh =
P
s s
R1eh hs dGs(hs)P
s s
R1eh dGs(hs)
denotes the average labor eciency of those who consume the variety.
Appendix J: Data and numerical implementation
This appendix provides an overview of the data that we use and the way we ran the numerical
simulations. The les containing the data, as well as the Mathematica notebooks and the Stata
do-les, are available from the authors upon request.
General considerations. To illustrate our model numerically, we require data on the U.S. income
distribution, as well as on average incomes and population sizes for both the U.S. and its trading
partners. Data on the U.S. household income distribution is taken from the annual CPS March
Supplements, available from the NBER website. Table A1 provides summary statistics and additional
information for that data from 1985 to 2009. We use the variable hearnval for the years 1989 to
2009, which reports yearly earnings for each household. For the years 1985 to 1988, we use the
comparable variable hhinctot, which reports yearly household income. In each year, we restrict
ourselves to households with at least one full-time earner. We also exclude all households who report
losses (negative values), and those who report less than $10 of income a year. We obtain both GDP
per capita in current U.S. dollars and population from 1985 to 2009 from the Penn World Table
Version 7 (variables cgdp and pop, respectively). Last, we choose the parameter values  = 24,
c = 0:1, and F = 100, so that our model produces a markup close to the mean U.S. manufacturing
markup of 0.30 reported by Feenstra and Weinstein (2010). Domowitz et al. (1988) estimate an
average markup of about 0.37 for the U.S. Our markup, using 2005 data, is given by 0.3283. For
the multi-sector case, we use a mean-preserving spread in  to dierentiate the sectors: 1 = 36 and
2 = 12. We also let 1 = 2 = 0:5 and keep the other parameter values.
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Bilateral trade liberalization. For the case of exponential income distributions, the only piece
of information we require is the average U.S. household income and the trading partner's average
household income. As we have no information on the average yearly household income in 2005 for
the 188 trading partners, we instead use GDP per capita. To make that data comparable to the U.S.
household income, we scale the GDP per capita of each trading partner using as a scaling factor the
ratio of the U.S. household income to the U.S. GDP per capita in 2005. Implementing the model
numerically is then done using the various expressions given in the main text. We also check both
the sucient condition (19) and the necessary and sucient condition (J.1) numerically. To this end,
we evaluate these conditions for the exponential case at every point eh between $10 and $1,000,000
with steps of size $10. We experimented with dierent ranges and step sizes, and our ndings are
robust.
For the case of a non-parametric U.S. income distribution, we use the whole distribution of the
observed U.S. household incomes in 2005 from the CPS data (53,897 households). Since we have no
information on the shapes of the income distributions of the trading partners, we continue to assume
that their distributions are exponential. Note that our assumption of exponential distributions for
the trading partners is solely motivated by a lack of data. It is, however, not very restrictive since
the shape of each trading partner's income distribution matters only for checking the necessary and
sucient condition (J.1) in the non-parametric case. We discretize that condition { since we no longer
have continuous distributions { and we check it up to the maximum observed household income level
in the CPS data (as no rm would obviously want to exclude all U.S. consumers from the market). In
the non-parametric case, we evaluate the necessary and sucient condition at every point eh between
$1 and the highest income in the sample (see Table A.1). The step size is $1 for the rst $300, and
then $10 for the rest. We again experimented with dierent ranges and step sizes, and our ndings
are robust.
We check for each trading partner whether product diversity in consumption decreases, by eval-
uating condition (16). If there is a variety loss, we solve for the labor eciency of the thresh-
old consumer hlossUS by equating (18) to zero, which allows us to compute the percentage of losers
100[1 GUS(hlossUS )] whose incomes exceed that threshold. These are the values depicted in Figures 2
and 5 and summarized in Table 1.
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Multilateral trade liberalization. Our multilateral analysis spans the period 1985 to 2009. For
the exponential case, we proceed in the same way as described in the bilateral case above. However,
we consider that the population and the average income of `country H' in each period t are those of
the U.S. and of all its trading partners with which FTAs were already active before period t. Starting
from this extended denition of `country H' in each period t, we then consider the changes in product
diversity, markups, and welfare that take place between t and t + 1. Two cases may arise. First,
there are periods where no new FTA between the U.S. and other countries take eect. In that case,
population and average income of `country H' (i.e., the U.S. and its current FTA trading partners)
change due to population changes and changes in GDP per capita. Second, there are periods where
new FTAs take eect. In that case, both internal changes in population and GDP per capita, as well
as external changes due to adding of new trading partner(s) occur. Since we are interested in the
`pure' eects of trade, we eliminate the impacts of internal changes by dividing each year into two
hypothetical periods. In the rst period of year t, we consider the adjustment of GDP per capita and
population starting from the end of year t  1, but without taking into account trade integration in
year t. We then consider, in the second period of year t, the impact of adding new trading partner(s).
The changes between the rst and the second subperiod of year t then give us the `pure' trade eects.
As in the bilateral case, we check both the sucient condition (19) and the necessary and sucient
condition (J.1) at each period, using the same ranges and the same step sizes. In the non-parametric
case, we use the full CPS household income distribution for each year (see Table A.1 for summary
information). We again discretize the conditions that we check in that case. Observe from Table 2
that the necessary and sucient condition holds for all years in the non-parametric case, whereas
it is violated from 2006 on in the exponential case. We therefore do not report post-2006 results in
details in that latter case.
Finally, as in the bilateral case, we check at the end of each period whether product diversity in
consumption decreases by evaluating condition (16). If there is a variety loss, we solve for the labor
eciency of the threshold consumer hlossUS by equating (18) to zero, which allows us to compute the
percentage of losers 100[1 GUS(hlossUS )] whose incomes exceed that threshold. We report these values
in Table 2.
53
Necessary and sucient condition for the single sector case. The necessary and sucient
condition for the symmetric price equilibrium is r(ep) = (ep  cw)Qr(ep)  (p  cw)Qr(p) = r(p). In
words, no rm can increase its prot by charging a dierent price than that of all the other rms.
Using (F.6), and noting that expression (F.1) implies (1=) ln(ep=p) = weh=(Np), the condition can
be rewritten as
w
Np

Lr
Z 1
eh hr dGr(hr) + Ls
Z 1
eh hs dGs(hs)

  eh Lr Z 1eh dGr(hr) + Ls
Z 1
eh dGs(hs)

 p  cwep  cwQr(p) = wh=Nep  cw wh(Lr + Ls)Np ;
where we use p = cw + wh=N and Qr(p) = wh(Lr + Ls)=(Np) to obtain the last equality. Noting
that U(eh) = N [1  e weh=(Np)] and that   Lr=L, we have
h

heh  eh+ h
(
e weh=(Np)
[1 Gr(eh)] + (1  )[1 Gs(eh)] hh+ cU(eh)
)
= eh+ h( 1  U(eh)=N
[1 Gr(eh)] + (1  )[1 Gs(eh)] hh+ cU(eh)
)
= eh+ h( 1
[1 Gr(eh)] + (1  )[1 Gs(eh)] 1  f1=[hD(L)]gU(
eh)
1 + [c=(h)]U(eh)
)
; (J.1)
where U(eh) = hD(L)f1  e (eh=h)=[+cD(L)]g. Condition (J.1) is used in the computations.
Necessary and sucient condition for the two-sector case. The necessary and sucient
condition for the symmetric price equilibrium for the two-sector case is 1r(ep1) = (ep1  cw)Q1r(ep1) 
(p1  cw)Q1r(p1) = 1r(p1) for sector 1, and 2r(ep2) = (ep2  cw)Q2r(ep2)  (p2  cw)Q2r(p2) = 2r(p2)
for sector 2, where
Q1r(ep1) = Lr Z 1eh q1r(ep1; hr)dGr(hr) + Ls
Z 1
eh q1s(ep1; hs)dGs(hs) (J.2)
with the mirror expression holding for sector 2. Plugging (21) and (22) into (20), and imposing
symmetry on prices, we have
q1r(ep1; hr) = wP I1(hr)  11 ln
ep1
p1

and q1s(ep1; hs) = wP I1(hs)  11 ln
ep1
p1

; (J.3)
with
I1(hr)  hr   P
1w
ln p1 +
H
1w
  N2p2
2w
ln

2
1
@Ur=@U2r
@Ur=@U1r

I1(hs)  hs   P
1w
ln p1 +
H
1w
  N2p2
2w
ln

2
1
@Us=@U2s
@Us=@U1s

;
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where P  N1p1 + (1=2)N2p2 and H  N1p1 ln p1 + (1=2)N2p2 ln p2 are the sum of prices and a
measure of price dispersion. Plugging (J.3) into (J.2), we get
Q1r(ep1) = wP

Lr
Z 1
eh I1(hr) dGr(hr) + Ls
Z 1
eh I1(hs) dGs(hs)

  1
1
ln
ep1
p1

Lr
Z 1
eh dGr(hr) + Ls
Z 1
eh dGs(hs)

with the mirror expression holding again for sector 2. The labor eciency of the marginal consumer,eh, who is indierent between consuming and not consuming the variety produced by the deviating
rm, must satisfy q1r(ep1;eh) = q1s(ep1;eh) = 0, which yields
I1(eh)  max0; P
1w
ln
ep1
p1

: (J.4)
Using (J.2), and noting that expression (J.4) implies (1=1) ln(ep1=p1) = wI1(eh)=P, the necessary and
sucient condition can be rewritten as
w
P

Lr
Z 1
eh I1(hr) dGr(hr) + Ls
Z 1
eh I1(hs) dGs(hs)

 I1(eh) Lr Z 1eh dGr(hr) + Ls
Z 1
eh dGs(hs)

 p1   cwep1   cwQ1r(p1):
Noting that
Q1r(p) =
w
P

Lr
Z 1
0
I1(hr) dGr(hr) + Ls
Z 1
0
I1(hs) dGs(hs)

;
the necessary and sucient condition can be successively rewritten as

R1eh I1(hr) dGr(hr) + (1  ) R1eh I1(hs) dGs(hs)

R1eh dGr(hr) + (1  ) R1eh dGs(hs)
 I1(eh) + p1   cwep  cw 
R1
0
I1(hr) dGr(hr) + (1  )
R1
0
I1(hs) dGs(hs)

R1eh dGr(hr) + (1  ) R1eh dGs(hs)
= I1(eh) + p1   cw
p1e
w
P I1(
eh)   cw

R1
0
I1(hr) dGr(hr) + (1  )
R1
0
I1(hs) dGs(hs)

R1eh dGr(hr) + (1  ) R1eh dGs(hs)
= I1(eh) + 1 W1
e
w
P I1(
eh)  W1

R1
0
I1(hr) dGr(hr) + (1  )
R1
0
I1(hs) dGs(hs)

R1eh dGr(hr) + (1  ) R1eh dGs(hs) ; (J.5)
where w, P, I1(eh), I1(hr), and I1(hs) are evaluated at equilibrium. Condition (J.5), together with the
mirror expression for sector 2 must jointly hold for the symmetric price to be the price equilibrium
in the two-sector model.
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Table A1: Yearly household income distributions from the CPS March Supplements
Year cps Variable # obs. Avg. HH income Std. dev. Min Max
1985 hhinctot 39730 33696.89 22770.23 15 352729
1986 hhinctot 39038 35555.27 23638.96 20 482262
1987 hhinctot 38768 37193.70 24915.95 12 393379
1988 hhinctot 39430 38966.70 25830.97 13 462996
1989 hearnval 36848 36968.48 24440.71 19 294998
1990 hearnval 40259 39405.65 26213.23 50 305660
1991 hearnval 39242 40574.39 26538.71 50 220998
1992 hearnval 38541 41623.54 27206.72 35 246999
1993 hearnval 38394 42746.18 28174.77 10 274998
1994 hearnval 34267 45120.41 29647.13 33 297000
1995 hearnval 34430 46895.59 31007.7 11 359998
1996 hearnval 32979 49936.14 44775.14 10 648372
1997 hearnval 33732 52231.20 48447.11 10 676866
1998 hearnval 34138 54692.91 51374.99 50 662127
1999 hearnval 34691 56855.94 52221.06 25 708935
2000 hearnval 35442 57850.91 46754.72 12 616429
2001 hearnval 34121 62456.03 57103.31 10 670230
2002 hearnval 55352 66430.65 60917.75 50 687064
2003 hearnval 54996 66897.30 62688.19 46 988317
2004 hearnval 54146 68488.96 63198.95 40 971401
2005 hearnval 53897 69613.34 65273.66 10 994333
2006 hearnval 53759 72766.30 68768.85 13 959380
2007 hearnval 53751 76128.38 73850.67 10 1194802
2008 hearnval 53425 77748.16 69787.74 10 956730
2009 hearnval 51116 81176.40 72223.07 10 936683
Notes: All data from the annual CPS March Supplements, available from the NBER
website. Data reported is household income (pre 1989) or household earnings (post
1988) in current US$ for households with at least one full-time earner (variable
bfullpar from 1985 to 1988; a wkstat for 1989 to 2009, except for 1994 and 1995
where we use prwkstat). We exclude households who report losses (negative values)
or annual income of less that $10.
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